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awaits manifold Muslim as well as non-Muslim perspectives across disciplinary and geo-cultural lines, including a richer body of sociological data than is available today.

In Search of the Public Square

For contemporary mainstream liberalism, a minimal consensus on moral or ethical precepts^[6] is part of the *quid pro quo* for a maximal consensus on the rules and mores of coexistence amid diversity. “The ethic central to a liberal society is an ethic of the right rather than the good,” observes Charles Taylor; “its basic principles concern how society should respond to arbitrate the competing demands of individuals.” In effect, “society must be neutral on the question of the good life” – that is, on what most of us would deem the core question of personal and social ethics.^[8] Indeed, even the classical, Aristotelian definition of ‘good’ broadly amounted to just such a perspective in its pragmatic stress on what is appropriate rather than morally correct.^[9] At its most emphatic, this posture leads to Richard Rorty’s compromise of higher amorality: the many, competing quests for Truth have all been discredited anyway, so democratic pragmatism favours moral indifference.^[10]

Another way of framing this central liberal ‘bargain’, in terms closer to the conceptual and policy concerns of civil society, is that the more a state is committed to a minimal agenda of negative liberties (freedoms from intrusions against the sanctity of the individual and his choices), the greater the prospect of maximising the plural goals that citizens and communities wish to pursue - and the less the danger of ‘Utopianu 6 (o) r 9 - r 4 t



adjunct but a replacement of ‘Judeo-Christian ethics’. This, she asserts, is because of the greater pluralist reach of the former which has acquired global status, and the discrediting of religion-based tenets of behaviour whose traditional proponents (and ‘Victorian’ sensibilities) are responsible for a hypocritical disjunction between precept and practice.

Given that a secular landscape is felt to be the proper locus for modern civic culture,^[16] perhaps that rejection is predictable. Nevertheless, a robust occidental critique of the foregoing has emerged since the mid-1990s, spearheaded by the ‘communitarian movement’ that draws on liberal values like the rule of law and pluralism, coupled with the civic republican tenets of social trust, self-help and community-building. Among the leading trans-Atlantic proponents of communitarianism are Amitai Etzioni, Anthony Giddens, John Gray, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Robert Kuttner, Robert Putnam and Michael Sandel, a broad church with varying political affiliations but joined by their primary concern about the corrosive effects of liberal individualism on solidarity and engaged citizenship.^[17] For Himmelfarb and others on the more conservative end of the spectrum, the traditional morality dismissed by Smith is a condition *sine qua non* to advance civil society; any other brand of ‘social ethics’ lacks substance and undermines the desired civic ethos. For Giddens, Kuttner and other more liberal communitarians, it is chiefly economic/free market individualism that undercuts social solidarity; to counter this tendency, public policy must draw on a shared ethos of civic patriotism. Both conservative and liberal tendencies decry the sharp dichotomy between private and public ethics that is the staple of mainstream liberalism and its conception of civil society.

Yet the communitarian critique has been seized upon by those with a less pluralist commitment, and pressed into the service of a cultural patriotism that privileges a particular view of the Judeo-Christian ethic. In the influential writings of Samuel P. Huntington on the ‘clash of civilisations’, what is seen as a decline in fealty to traditional values (like respect for education, family integrity and the rule of law) is treated as a root cause of growing Euro-American political and economic weakness in relation to other cultural zones or civilisations, notably that of Islam.^[18] As I have noted elsewhere, Huntington sees no contradiction in issuing a summons on behalf of ‘western’ ethical values that pointedly degrades the multicultural components (and citizenry) of Euro-American polities.^[19] At the same time, he is oblivious of new realities of global citizenship and culture that enlarge civic membership beyond traditional frontiers of nationality and geography. Huntington’s thesis lends itself to a validation of a closed view of society in response to the incursion of non-western values and people^[20] – which is surely antithetical to the open society envisaged by most theorists as vital to a mature civic culture.

The communitarian movement and other critiques of ‘radical secularity’ (after Taylor) tend to find themselves defending, at best, a marginal nexus between morally based social ethics and the modern public sphere. In this vein, Etzioni observes that the ‘moral revivalists’ among his fellow communitarians are really in pursuit of the ‘good society’ rather than civil society,^[21] implying that social virtues need to be siphoned-off from civic values. Inasmuch as the rationale is a concern for civil liberties and the rule of law (rather than on responsibility as a counterweight to rights), it seems to reaffirm the primacy of an individualist ethos in the civic calculus.^[22] It also brings us full circle to Gellner’s stance that



- or being ‘communalist’ in his resistance to bonds outside of kinship, religion and tribe.^[24] This captures the essence of a liberal definition of civil society that is mistrustful of serious ethical affinities. The corollary for Muslim and other ‘segmentary’ communities, as Gellner puts it squarely, is a choice between the traditional bonds of the *umma*, and the strictly secular bonds of pluralist civic modernity.^[25]

There is much that Gellner and other mainstream theorists can be challenged about in the sweeping assumptions concerning Islam, the *umma* and ‘civic culture’.^[26] Apart from the Orientalist overtones of some of those assumptions, the notion that the social capital generated by communal bonds is vitiated by a uniform resistance to freely moving in and out of such associations, is surely anchored in a limited understanding of how fluid those bonds often are.^[27] The paramount concern here, however, is specifically about the unfolding nexus between social ethics and civil society - in terms of mainstream and, in the rest of this analysis, transitional Muslim contexts. I say ‘transitional’ in recognition of the quest for democratic modernity and its attendant civic culture that marks the contemporary reality of those societies and communities. Muslim critiques - unlike those of their western counterparts - are not, of course, directed at existing indigenous models but at putative/emerging ones. The stakes range far beyond mere theory, to the realm of competing choices with far-reaching social and political implications.

Finding the Public Square

Before venturing into the rationales for an ethically-sensitive Muslim approach to civic culture, it is necessary to delineate the elements that define the latter, *dehors* the bounds of liberal, conservative or other political ideology. Most theorists and activists concur that any modern civil society must include three requisite elements: the rule of law, equal citizenship, and participatory politics with state accountability to the civic sphere. These primary elements in turn favour the organic separation of state and society, the independence of the judiciary as well as of the media, and guarantees of free association and thought. Only then is it meaningful to invoke a ‘public sphere’ in which civic interaction can occur.^[28] No matter how desirable the existence of this civic culture in a secure and legitimate public space, it is value-neutral in the sense of commanding no allegiance to specific moral principles. There are moral dimensions to human rights that uphold the integrity of individual and communal life, belief and equality; but appeals to secular law are sufficient to safeguard these entitlements.

The value-neutral nature of these elements also accounts for how a rigorous critic of liberal ideology like E.P. Thompson could be effusive about an institution often associated with economic and social inequity: “the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good.”^[29] Thompson’s recognition of the instrumental value of the rule of law in limiting state power and safeguarding individual liberties had nothing to do with moral value; his praise could be recast as “an unqualified civic good”. The same is true of the other defining elements, from equal citizenship to freedom of worship: each is cherished instrumentally *qua* civic good in this ‘procedural liberal’ perspective. Indeed, the logic extends to the institutional basis of secular culture - the separation of Church and State - which accompanies the autonomy of state and civic spheres. There is much to contest even in a nuanced appreciation of what



secularism means; but ‘secular culture’ as an institutional facet of civil society is here taken to be value-neutral, without the anti-religious resonance that often attaches to it.^[30]

Admittedly, the liberal ideal of civil society as a zone of freedom, tolerance and politico-economic choice that can face down both despotism and the atomisation of communities,^[31] comes close to a conception of civic ‘virtue’. Fed by the historical streams of west European contests among monarchical and church institutions and the emerging bourgeoisie, and the more recent east/central European contests between totalitarian state institutions and the volk, a powerful wave of Civic Truth has swept contemporary discourse. The State is effectively seen as bad and Society as good. Hence human rights tend to be defined narrowly as limits on the power of the state (negative liberties), and only reluctantly as involving fundamental socio-economic obligations and individual responsibility.^[32] In this characterisation, the quality of the public square is a function of society’s autonomy from the state. It is but a short step to the generalisation that all civil societies must be thus defined, irrespective of the diversity of historical and cultural reed, irrespective o33.98 0 T(obliga)4.7(ti3n)7 .003g9(s5(ectiune’. Fe)12 019.25 0 TD0.00



Muslim thinkers and activists like Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohamed ‘Aded al-Jabri, Fazlur Rahman, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, Nurcolish Madjid, Chandra Muzaffar, Mohammed Arkoun, Basam Tibi and Abdullahi An-Na‘im,^[36] some of whose works are drawn upon in the remainder of this analysis.

Locating Muslim Social Ethics

There is rich irony in having to negotiate the nexus between ethics and civic culture past the currents and eddies of ‘secularism’ and ‘religion’ even outside the West’s Cartesian dualisms. Islam and Muslims have long shared a *Weltanschauung* - as ethos or worldview - wherein the sacred and secular (*din* and *dunya*) as well as the state (*dawla*) are merged. Yet the reductive idea of a “moral totality validated entirely by divine teaching continues to dominate contemporary Islamic discourse”, observes Arkoun, “and has even assumed an unprecedented public dimension, thanks to the multiplier effect of the media”.^[37] Which, in turn, has more to do with nourishing the “social imaginary” than the exercise of moral reasoning that is critical to social ethics.

The irony is that in Islam’s classical age when the leading ethical texts emerged, drawing inspiration both from the wellsprings of scripture and the philosophical heritage of the Mediterranean world, a moral critique of politics was not seen as profaning sacred norms. The pragmatic rationale for the *Virtuous City* of Farabi (d. 950) was the interdependence of human beings in pursuit of self-sufficiency and fulfilment, a voluntary quest that he felt required the social and spiritual inspiration of Islam.^[38] Moral traits (*akhlaq*) and habits (*adab*) were individual acquisitions with a social purpose, transcending the public-private divide. This perspective, expanded on by Miskawayh (d. 1030) in *The Cultivation of Morals (Tahdhib al-Akhlaq)*,^[39] and its Perso-Shi‘i counterpart, *The Nasirean Ethics (Akhlāq-i Nasiri)* of Tusi (d. 1274)^[40] drew conspicuously on Aristotle and neo-Platonist sources.^[41] In the new Muslim ethos, integrity, courage, temperance, charity, justice and reason were virtues that made for individual happiness and the ideal *umma*. In the writings of Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), notably the *Criterion of Moral Action (Mizan al-Amal)*, they find expression not only as a set of social and personal rules about right and wrong, but also become part of a process of moral reasoning.^[42]

Yet that aspect of ethics, as furnishing a critique of political as well as individual conduct, was in contestation with the role of the enacted *shari‘a*, the corpus of ethico-legal norms derived from the Qur’an, Prophetic traditions (*sunna*) and assorted subsidiary sources (like community consensus, and the interpretive reasoning of legal experts). While Ghazali brought his considerable authority to bear in casting a sceptical eye on the perceived ethical deficits of those wielding the *shari‘a* as legislation, the overarching historical trend was of the latter’s dominion.^[43] The reasons were many and varied, leading a number of jurists from around the 11th century to affirm the “closure of the gate of *ijtihad*” (independent legal reasoning).^[44]



Not surprisingly, the die was cast for the caliph or sultan to seek the active collaboration of the *'ulema*, as a mutually expedient arrangement: the former in pursuit of 'religious' legitimacy, the latter for enhanced political authority.^[45] Although this did not preclude *ad hoc* ethical judgments by communities and individuals about the conduct of civic affairs through to the modern era, the sacralisation of the law curtailed the scope, potency and systematisation of such a critique. The potential of ethico-legal principles as *rationes legis* – generalised tenets that could be applied to specific cases – was overshadowed by *taqlid*, an imitative compliance with a set of specific rules extracted from the manuals of various legal schools.

Since the sacralisation of law also enhances the legitimacy of establishments that can invoke it for the exercise of their authority, the tension with those seeking civic accountability is obvious. The hallowed phrase *siyasa shari'a* refers formally to the political/administrative facets of the law - but also signals attempts at sacralising political power.^[46] In post-revolutionary Iran, for example, the constitutional tenet of *Velayat-e-Faqih* (rule of the juriconsult) confers special authority on 'supreme religious leader' as well as on the clergy and clerical courts. This includes strong influence over the media.^[47] In Saudi Arabia, for example, princely and clerical institutions intertwine in enforcing conservative Wahabbi domination of civic life. Elsewhere, the primacy of the *shari'a* – as interpreted by traditionalist establishments – trumps secular law and circumscribes civic discourse, as witness recent developments in Egypt and Pakistan with regard to strictures on blasphemy, apostasy and gender equality.^[48]

All of which underscores the need to separate the institutions of state, religion and society as a shared modern democratic and ethical imperative. Far from violating Islam's *Weltanschauung*, this institutional separation is a means of advancing its civic spirit in practice. Secular culture

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secular constitution enjoys widespread endorsement, with 'Islam' perceived foremost as an affirmation of personal spiritual and ethical values. Although most citizens identified themselves positively as Muslims, few considered themselves to be observant.^[52]

In neighbouring Turkey, majorities of 78 to 85 per cent have opposed amending the civil code to accommodate *shari'a* norms concerning women – yet robust majorities favour social practices like prohibiting the sale of alcohol during Ramadan, allowing exclusively religious marriages, and modest public dressing by women.^[53] In both instances, and one suspects across much of post-Soviet Central Asia and beyond, support for secular culture and religiously based social ethics is perceived not only as compatible but also as desirable. It also bears pointing out that a symbiotic nexus between law and social ethics is integral to the evolution of modern legal systems, and that a seminal principle of Muslim ethics is respect for the rule of law. Again, if transitional societies often draw on their ethical heritage to compensate for the weakness of the rule of law, they may also need to do so in terms of solidarity and self-organisation – the social capital of civic culture – especially when state institutions are fragile. Social capital is customarily seen as stemming from engaged citizenship, an elusive expectation in pre-democratic states. However, social traditions relating to charitable endowments (*waqfs*), direct and institutional aid through religious tithes (*zakat*) for the disadvantaged and community-based schools (*madrassas*) have deep roots in Muslim praxis. Regional variants include the *mahallas* (neighbourhood organisations) and *gaps* (interest-free support associations) in post-Soviet Central Asia. The potency of these ethical affinities becomes all the more evident in times of crises, when official institutions prove inadequate. This occurred rather conspicuously during the massive Turkish earthquake of August 1999, when mosque-based self-help initiatives were often the principal source of aid for thousands in need of food and shelter in several towns and cities; a militantly secular *devlet baba* (paternal state) was challenged by the civic energies of 'Islam'.eeqf



politics. In states where the primacy of the *shari'a* curtails democratic avenues of accountability and participation, an ethical critique may effectively be the only available means to challenge the clerical establishment. This has typically been the case in post-revolutionary Iran. Intellectuals



groundless pride and arrogance – all are concrete manifestations of this spirit of *hilm*.”^[58] It is an attribute that derives from the ‘traits’ of God, and becomes the highest aspiration of the community at large. It also counters the thrust of those inclined to resort to self-serving, decontextualised quotation from scripture and Prophetic tradition in support of political agendas whose legitimacy beggars the sanction of reason, revelation or civilisation.

Conclusion

The polarity between mainstream liberal conceptions of civil society and putative Muslim approaches devolves ultimately to the locus of social ethics. While the world’s Muslims are diverse in their understandings of Islam, they share a *Weltanschauung* in which *din* and *dunya* are merged; both secular and sacred resonate in the public sphere. Far from precluding the institutional separation of Mosque and State, this perspective takes no ideological position: the *umma* can thrive in a plurality of political arrangements. The occidental liberal conception of civil society is not inimical to Muslim traditions simply because it is wedded to secular space. On the contrary, the primacy of the rule of law, participatory and dialogical politics, and the integrity of individual membership in a pluralist community are cherished by both traditions. However, a secularity that banishes social ethics from the public square is alien to Islam, for the moral orientation of individual and *umma* alike are privileged as public and private goals. There are obvious pitfalls in this privileging in the context of civil society.

Pluralism – of culture, thought and life-goals – as well as the capacity of modern states to abuse power, suggest that ethical frameworks should be bounded by democratic and civic commitments, including human rights. Bassam Tibi has cogently observed that the underlying challenge is about relocating civic life from a jealously-guarded ‘religious’ domain (in the reductive sense that Arkoun was quoted as lamenting) to a cultural-political one that accommodates the warp and woof of modernity.^[59] For all the cultural anomie (after Durkheim) that is said to afflict Muslim elites in this Age of Anxiety, the prospects for civic life are scarcely likely to be enhanced by ‘religiously-led’ invocations of political or social authority. There is sufficient evidence on this score from contemporary transitional societies, including Saudi Arabia and the poignancy of Afghanistan’s post-1995 experience under the Taliban regime. As well, the rigidities of traditionalism that can reduce ethics to the minutiae of law must be resisted. If ‘Muslim ethics’ are to have salience in the public square, they must draw on a moral reasoning that transcends mere scriptural citation – and takes full account of the emerging discourse of global ethics.^[60] Acts of political violence, for instance, must be understood as breaching the foundations of acceptable conduct by rupturing the social order in which the *umma* has its being and orientation, within and beyond the frontiers of Muslim-majority states. A moral calculus in this context would be mindful of Soroush’s plea for a pragmatism that focuses on the quotidian demands of secular life, yet finds inspiration in the verities of civilisational values. “Concern for individual rights, properly understood, is indeed compatible with community, duty, and virtue”, is a claim made for republican liberalism.^[61] It could well be articulated by any number of Muslim reformers on behalf of the ‘Muslim public square’.



Notes

1. See, inter alia, J. Cohen and A. Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); E. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994); J.A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995); J. Haynes, *Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World: Politics and New Political Movements* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997); J. Keane, *Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); L.C. McClain and J.E. Fleming, “Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists”, in *Chicago-Kent Law Review* (2000), 75.2, p. 301; London School of Economics, *Global Civil Society Yearbook 2001* (Oxford – London: Oxford University Press, 2001); A. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1992); C. Taylor, “Invoking Civil Society”, in *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 204.
2. Typically, see Gellner, “Islam” in *Conditions of Liberty*, p. 15-29; Serif Mardin, “Civil Society and Islam”, in *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, p. 301; M. Sariolghalam, “Prospects for Civil Society in the Middle East: An Analysis of Cultural Impediments”, in E. Ozdalga and S. Persson (eds.), *Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World* (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1997), p. 55.
3. See my cautionary comment on this score (2001): “Muslims Beware” (Op-ed) in *The Guardian* (London), 14 September, p. 22; and also shortly prior to the events of 11 September with regard to the use of religious rhetoric in political conflicts (2001): “No ticket to paradise” (Op-ed) in *The Guardian*, 4 September, p. 16.
4. On the ‘Constitution of Medina’, see R.N. Bellah (ed.), *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditionalist World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), especially p. 150-151; on Farabi and the ethical heritage in Islam, see R. Walzer, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); M. Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994); R.G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Ethics in Islam* (Malibu, Cal.: Undena Publications, 1985).
5. See J. Habermas, “Civil Society and the Political Public Sphere” in *Between Facts and Norms*, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, Mass. – Cambridge, UK: MIT Press / Polity Press, 1996), p. 329-387; C. Taylor, “The Public Sphere” in *Philosophical Arguments*, p. 257-87.
6. ‘Ethics’ and ‘morals’ are generally used interchangeably in contemporary parlance, scholarly and otherwise. Both are rooted in the Greek/Latin for ‘customs’, viz. *ethikos* and *mores*



8. — — p. 194. Taylor observes that in a broad sense, the “right” may include “the shared good”. But strictly speaking, a liberal consensus among citizens in increasingly pluralist societies is about such shared goods as individual dignity and sanctity, and respect for the rule of law, in other words, values that maintain social harmony.

9. Hence “virtue” is “human excellence”, which requires man to “perform his function well”: *The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. J.A.K. Thompson (London: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 99-100; and Jonathan Barnes’s introduction in the same volume, especially p. 29-36.

10. R. Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”, in *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 176. He therefore advocates working for a “post-Philosophical culture” in the name of civic pluralism.

11. See I. Berlin, *Four essays on liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), and *The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their History* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996); K. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. 1 (London, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1945; reprinted London: Routledge, 1999).

12. Notably the ‘international bill of rights’ that comprises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and the ensuing United Nations covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. See generally C. Hesse and R. Post (eds.), *Human Rights and Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia* (New York: Zone Books, 1999); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*



Moralization of Society: From Victorian Virtues to Modern Values (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1995); R. Kuttner, *Everything is for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1997); M. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

18. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). The book elaborated on themes that Huntington had first set forth in a controversial essay, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, in *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), 72.3, p. 22.

19. A.B. Sajoo, “The Crescent in the Public Square”, in *Islam in America* (1997), 3.4 , p. 1, and “The Islamic Ethos and the Spirit of Humanism”, in *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 8 (1995), p. 579. See also B. Turner, *Orientalism, Post-modernism and Globalism* (London – New York: Routledge, 1994).

20. See, for example, J. Clark, “Americans are blind to barbarians at thei



27. See D. Eickelman, “Inside the Islamic Reformation”, in *Wilson Quarterly* 22.1, (1998), p. 80; D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori (eds.), *Muslim Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); J.L. Esposito and J. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); E. Ozdalga, “Civil Society and Its Enemies”, in *Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World*, 73.

28. See Taylor, “The Public Sphere”, in *Philosophical Arguments*, p. 257-87.

29. Quoted in D.H. Cole, “An Unqualified Human Good: E.P. Thompson and the Rule of Law”, in *Journal of Law and Society* 28.2 (2001), p. 177-203, at p. 182. Cole shows that Thompson’s “minimal conception” of the rule of law – a functional view that contrasts with more elaborate, ideology-ridd02 wpsol(a)j/TT6 1 Tf16.n..a8gt:.00eition8()Tbe 0.0002 Tlridd02 wps.00emocrderis6omJom -1T



Human Rights (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 107-141; F. Rahman, “Law and Ethics in Islam”. in *Ethics in Islam*, p. 3-15; M. Sadri and A. Sadri (eds.), *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of 'Abdolkarim Soroush* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); R. Wright, “Two Visions of Reformation” (on Soroush and Ghannouchi), in *Journal of Democracy* 7 (1996), p. 64-75.

37. Arkoun, “Ethics and Politics” in *Rethinking Islam*, p. 117.

38. Walzer, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State*, p. 229-259.

39. Miskawayh, *The Refinement of Character*, trans. by C.K. Zurayk (Beirut: American University, 1968).

40. Nasir ad-Din Tusi, *The Nasirean Ethics*, trans. by G.M. Wic.M. Wic.M. Wic.M. Wic.M.mic.Mf8.162-indon.



48. See generally A.S. Moussali, “Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses on Civil Society, Pluralism and Democracy”, in A.R. Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol. 1 (Leiden – New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 79.

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